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Abstract 
European citizenship entails, for EU nationals, a right to belong across borders. This article 
questions the implications of this latter right for the status of third country nationals in the EU. It 
contributes to address a gap between the literature on European citizenship and the literature on 
the admission and civic integration of third country nationals. The article begins by tracing a 
disconnect in the rules and narratives on admission and naturalisation of third country nationals 
in the EU. This is a disconnect between logics of individual rights protection, which European 
citizenship infiltrates, and logics of state sovereignty and governmental discretion, which 
otherwise dominate relevant rules and narratives. The article relies on the political science 
OLWHUDWXUHRQPXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQDQGGHPRLFUDF\WRUHLQWHUSUHW(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VQRUPof 
belonging across borders so as to reconcile the disconnect. Ultimately, the theoretical bridge 
that the article draws between citizenship narratives and immigration narratives offers a novel 
perspective on the tension between liberal values and integration discourses in Europe. It also 
sets out a possible frame to begin rethinking rules of engagement and cooperation in the context 
of the EU common immigration policy. 
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I  Introduction 
In January 2015, Lassana Bathily saved a number of people in a French supermarket from death 
at the hands of ruthless terrorists. As a reward, in March 2015 he was awarded French 
citizenship.1 Rani Pushpa, an Indian woman, failed to learn Italian in 10 years of Italian 
residence. As a sanction, in March 2015, she was prevented from taking the oath of Italian 
citizenship.2 In June 2015, the beaches around Ventimiglia on the border between Italy and 
France portrayed a disheartening scenario: bathing European citizens looking for a tan, and 
homeless third country asylum seekers, hoping to cross into France despite the French police 
pushbacks, and meanwhile looking for shelter.3  
These disparate stories point in a common direction. Inclusion of a third country national (TCN) 
as a citizen, resident, or just temporary visitor in a EU Member State depends in good part on 
governmental discretion in deciding on inclusion and exclusion. Yet belonging in a EU Member 
State at its fullest entails a supranational citizenship, which limits governmental discretion in a 
number of ways.  
This article focuses precisely on how European citizenship affects, in this sense, the rules of the 
immigration game. It questions how European citizenship rules matter for the status and rights of 
TCNs in the EUDQGKRZ(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VXQGHUO\LQJUDWLRQDOHVPD\FRQWULEXWHWRUHWKLQN
rules of engagement and of cooperation in the context of a common European immigration 
policy.  
The quest may seem ill-defined, at a time when (XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VUHOHYDQFHWR(XURSHDQG
to the project of integration is under threat from several perspectives. First, the right of free 
movement in which European citizenship finds most concrete expression is in practice relevant 
to few, but has drawn the attention of many in Euro-skeptical political agendas, and has 
ultimately become exposed to judicial backlash.4 6HFRQG(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VSROLWLFDO
irrelevance becomes egregious at a time when Europe is confronted with harsh expressions of 
QDWLRQDOYRLFHDQGWDQJLEOHWKUHDWVRIH[LW)LQDOO\(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VULJKWV-protection 
OHJDF\DSSHDUVQXOOLILHGE\WKHGHKXPDQL]LQJH[SHULHQFHRIVHYHUDO7&1VDW(XURSH¶VIURQWLHUV  
It is precisely the danger of rushed demise, under the influence of these perspectives, of one of 
WKHULFKHVWFRQFHSWXDODFKLHYHPHQWVRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQWKDWPDNHVWKLVDUWLFOH¶V
investigation pressing. The article argues that European citizenship harbors an important  
theoretical acquis that is worth exploring further. It endeavors to spell out part of this acquis, by 
focusing on its relevance for the EU immigration regime. It begins by tracing a disconnect 
throughout rules, narratives, and rationales resulting, respectively, of European FLWL]HQVKLS¶V
engagement with TCNs, and of the EU common immigration policy and WKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶
immigration and nationality regimes. This is a disconnect between logics of individual rights 
protection, which European citizenship infiltrates into the domain of immigration and 
nationality, and logics of state interest and discretion which otherwise prevail in the latter 
                                                          
1
 See <http://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Lassana-Bathily-est-devenu-francais>.. 
2
 See <http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2015/03/01/sindaco-nega-cittadinanza_n_6778770.html>. The decision was 
later reverted. See infra para 0. 
3
 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/this-isnt-human-migrants-in-limbo-on-italian-french-
border?CMP=share. 
4 See e.g. Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358. 
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domain, informing the recognized VWDWH¶VSRZHUWRGHFLGHRQDGPLVVLRQDQGH[FOXVLRQ of aliens.5 
The article ultimately draws a conceptual model of European citizenship linking its internal (i.e. 
free movement of EU nationals) and external (i.e. inclusion of TCNs) functions through notions 
of mutual recognition and demoicracy.6 Central to this model is the argument that demoicratic 
ideas of trust and no othering, whose traces can be evidenced in the architecture of European 
FLWL]HQV¶IUHHPRYHPHQWPD\DOVRKHOSLQWHUSUHWWKHGLVWLQFWLYHQDUUDWLYHVWKDW(XURSHDQ
citizenship weaves in the field of immigration and nationality. This conceptual model inspires a 
SRVVLEOHQHZYLVLRQIRU0HPEHU6WDWHV¶HQJDJHPHQWDQGVXSUDQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQLQ
immigration matters, mediating between legitimate claims to belong and unquestioned powers to 
exclude, while offering a novel angle on notions of collective good which justify, in part, the 
latter powers.  
While the question of the relation between European citizenship and TCNs has been asked 
before in more and less direct ways,7 this article takes a novel methodological approach to it. 
First, it develops a granular analysis of how European citizenship logics intersect immigration 
ones by exploring not only the hard legal rules but also the narratives, legislative, judicial and 
political, surrounding them. Focusing on the narratives allows treating admission to residence 
and naturalisation, usually at the heart of separate debates on, respectively, immigration and 
nationality, as two prongs of a same working notion of inclusion.8 This is defined, for purposes 
                                                          
5
 See e.g. ECtHR, Sen v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 31465/96, judgment of 21 'HFHPEHUSDUµDVDPDWWHURI
well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of 
non-QDWLRQDOVLQWRLWVWHUULWRU\¶ 
6
 2QPXWXDOUHFRJQLWLRQVHH.1LFRODwGLVµ7UXVWLQJWKH3ROHV"&RQVWUXFWLQJ(XURSHWKURXJK0XWXDO5HFRJQLWLRQ¶
(2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 682-698; K. Nicolaïdis and *6KDIIHUµ7UDQVQDWLRQDO0XWXDO
5HFRJQLWLRQ5HJLPHV*RYHUQDQFHZLWKRXW*OREDO*RYHUQPHQW¶Law and Contemporary Problems 267-
.1LFRODwGLVµ.LU)RUHYHU"7KH-RXUQH\RID3ROLWLFDO6FLHQWLVWLQWKH/DQGVFDSHRI5HFRJQLWLRQ¶LQ0P. 
Maduro (ed.), The Past and Future of EU Law; The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the 
Rome Treaty (Hart, 2007); on demRLFUDF\.1LFRODwGLVµ7KH,GHDRI(XURSHDQ'HPRLFUDF\¶in J. Dickinson and P. 
Eleftheriadis (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 247; K. 
1LFRODwGLVµ(XURSHDQ'HPRLFUDF\DQGLWV&ULVLV¶Journal of Common Market Studies 351-369; F. 
Cheneval and )6FKLPPHOIHQQLJµ7KH&DVHIRU'HPRLFUDF\LQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶Journal of Common 
Market Studies 334-5%HOODP\µ$Q(YHU&ORVHU8QLRQDPRQJWKH3HRSOHVRI(XURSH5HSXEOLFDQ
IntergovernPHQWDOLVPDQG'HPRLFUDWLF5HSUHVHQWDWLRQZLWKLQWKH(8¶Journal of European Integration 
499-516. 
7
 6HHHJ'7K\Pµ(80LJUDWLRQ3ROLF\DQGLWV&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5DWLRQDOH$&RVPRSROLWDQ2XWORRN¶
Common Market Law Review 709-7365%DXE|FNµ:K\(XURSHDQ&LWL]HQVKLS"1RUPDWLYH$SSURDFKHVWR
6XSUDQDWLRQDO8QLRQ¶Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2007) 453-488, at 471-74 and 485-1&DPELHQµ8QLRQ
&LWL]HQVKLSDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ5HWKLQNLQJWKH&ODVVLFV"¶European Journal of Legal Studies 10-37; M. 
%HFNHUµ0DQDJLQJ'LYHUVLW\LQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ,QFOXVLYH(XURSHDQ&LWL]HQVKLSDQG7KLUG&RXQWU\1DWLRQDOV¶
(2004) 7 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 132-183. Other studies have taken more specific 
perspectives. See HJ<6RODQNHµ8VLQJWKH&LWL]HQWR%ULQJWKH5HIXJHHLQ*HUDUGR5XL]=DPEUDQRY2IILFH
1DWLRQDOGHO¶(PSORL21(0¶Modern Law Review 101-111*'DYLHVµ7KH)DPLO\5LJKWVRI(XURSHDQ
Children: Expulsion of non-(XURSHDQ3DUHQWV¶EUI Working Papers 2012/04, 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/20375/RSCAS_2012_04.pdf?sequence=1>. 
8
 For a study that engages European citizenship from the residence and immigration perspective, see D. Acosta 
$UFDUD]Rµ&LYLF&LWL]HQVKLS5HLQWURGXFHG"7KH/RQJ-Term Residence Directive as a Postnational Form of 
0HPEHUVKLS¶European Law Journal  200-219; for the naturalisation and nationality perspective, see D. 
.RFKHQRYµ5RXQGLQJ8SWKH&LUFOH7KH0XWDWLRQRI0HPEHU6WDWHV¶1DWLRQDOLWLHVXQGHU3UHVVXUHIURP(XURSHDQ
FLWL]HQVKLS¶EUI Working Papers 2010/23, 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13634/RSCAS_2010_23.corr.pdf?sequence=3>. 
 5 
 
RIWKHDUWLFOH¶VTXHVWDV the process that brings TCNs from legal otherness to partial or full legal 
membership. The fact that legal inclusion is a process, and not the immediate result of a TCN 
SDVVLQJWKHERUGHUGHSHQGVSUHFLVHO\RQWKHVWDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQSRZHUWRH[FOXGHDOLHQVE\
controlling borders and deciding on entry and residence. A second methodological novelty is in 
the interdisciplinary perspective that the article adopts. It applies concepts from theories of 
demoicracy and mutual recognition to link back the contrasts it identifies in the rules and 
narratives on citizenship and immigration to broader conundrums on rights and power.  
In this latter perspective, the article contributes, first, to the literature on mutual recognition.9 Its 
European citizenship lens magnifies connections between notions of mutual recognition in 
political theory and international relations,10 and technical legal ones in the area of freedom, 
security and justice (AFSJ).11 It also adds to the literature on European citizenship, stretching 
transnational understandings of the same in a new direction.12 Finally, the arguments developed 
in the article also offer hints to ongoing debates on interstate cooperation and sharing of 
responsibilities in the EU common immigration policy,13  and on civic integration and liberal 
nationalism. 14  
Part II charts the rules on the status of TCNs developed, respectively, in the penumbra of 
European citizenship, and as part of the EU common immigration policy and the Member States¶ 
                                                          
9
 1LFRODwGLVµ7UXVWLQJWKH3ROHV"¶above, n. 6; Nicolaïdis and Shaffer, above, n. 41LFRODwGLVµ.LU)RUHYHU"¶above, 
n. 41LFRODwGLVµ7UXVWLQJWKHSROHV"0DUN- towards a regulatory peace theory in a world of mutuDOUHFRJQLWLRQ¶
in I. Lianos and I. Blanc (eds.), Regulating Trade in Services in the EU and the WTO : Trust, Distrust and Economic 
Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 263-298; F. K. Padoa Schioppa (ed.), The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in the European Integration Process (Palgrave McMillan, 2005); C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in EU Law, (Oxford University Press, 2013); S. Schmidt (ed.), Mutual Recognition as a New Mode of 
Governance 5RXWOHGJH./HQDHUWVµ7KH3ULQFLSOHRI0XWXDO5HFRJQLWLRQLQWKH$UHDRI)UHHGRP6HFXULW\
DQG-XVWLFH¶7KH)RXUWK$QQXDO6Lr Jeremy Lever Lecture, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015, available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_freedom_judge_le
naerts.pdf (last visited 24 May 2016)00|VWOµ3UHFRQGLWLRQVDQG/LPLWVRI0XWXDO5HFRJQLWLRQ¶
Common Market Law Review, 405-436. 
10
 6HHHJ1LFRODwGLVµ7UXVWLQJWKH3ROHV"¶ above, n. 6. 
11
 See e.g. Möstl, above, n. 9. 
12
 6HHHJ'.RVWDNRSRXORXµ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ&LWL]HQVKLS:ULWLQJWKH)XWXUH¶European Law Journal 
623-5%HOODP\µ(YDOXDWLQJ8QLRQ&LWL]HQVKLS%HORQJLQJ5LJKWVDQG3DUWLFLSDWLRQZLWKLQWKH(8¶
Citizenship Studies 597-611; Bauböck, above, n. 7; R. Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship, (Edward Elgar, 1994); J. 
:HLOHUµ%UHDGDQG&LUFXVWKH6WDWHRI(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶Columbia Journal of European Law 223-248; N. 
1LF6KXLEQHµ7KH5HVLOLHQFHRI(80DUNHW&LWL]HQVKLS¶Common Market Law Review 1597-1628. 
13
 6HHHJ90LWVLOHJDVµ6ROLGDULW\DQG7UXVWLQWKH&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ$V\OXP6\VWHP¶Comparative 
Migration Studies 181-202'&DUXVRµ/RVWDW6HD¶German Law Journal, 1197-1208 (for a compelling 
parallel between EU migration policy and Economic and Monetary Union); S. TrevisanuWµ:KLFK%RUGHUVIRUWKH
(8,PPLJUDWLRQ3ROLF\"<DUGVWLFNVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO3URWHFWLRQIRU(8-RLQW%RUGHUV0DQDJHPHQW¶LQ/$zoulai 
and K. de Vries (eds.) EU Migration Law: Legal Complexities and Political Rationales (Oxford University Press, 
2014), 106-148. 
14
 6HHHJ'.RVWDNRSRXORXµ7KH$QDWRP\RI&LYLF,QWHJUDWLRQ¶Modern Law Review 933-958; S. 
:DOODFH*RRGPDQµ&RQWUROOLQJ,PPLJUDWLRQWKURXJK/DQJXDJHDQG&RXQWU\.QRZOHGJH5HTXLUHPHQWV¶
West European Politics 235-255; R. van Oers, E. Ersbøll and D. Kostakopoulou (eds.), A Re-definition of 
Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe (Martinus Nijhoff, &-RSSNHµ7KH,QHYLWDEOH
/LJKWHQLQJRI&LWL]HQVKLS¶European Journal of Sociology 9-/2UJDGµ,lliberal Liberalism-Cultural 
5HVWULFWLRQVRQ0LJUDWLRQDQG$FFHVVWR&LWL]HQVKLSLQ(XURSH¶American Journal of Comparative Law, 
53--+DPSVKLUHµ/LEHUDOLVPDQG&LWL]HQVKLS$FTXLVLWLRQ+RZ(DV\6KRXOG1DWXUDOL]DWLRQ%H"¶
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 953-971. 
 6 
 
immigration and nationality policies. It illustrates and compares the frames and purposes of 
relevant rules (II.A); it considers and contrasts a rights narrative and a discretion narrative 
developed through the interpretation and application of each set of rules (II.B); and ultimately it 
reflects on the disconnect that these rules and narratives portray and on the broader tensions 
between rights and sovereignty that this disconnect reveals (II.C). Part III questions European 
FLWL]HQVKLS¶V capacity to support the rules and narratives that it fosters with appropriate 
UDWLRQDOHV,WFRQVLGHUVKRZ(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VUHOHQWOHVVFKDOOHQJHWRQDWLRQDOERXQGDULHV
relies on a norm of mutual recognition of belonging (III.A); building on the implications of this 
norm of mutual recognition it develops a demoicratic reading of European citizenship (III.B); 
and it applies the demoicratic argument to attempt a reconciliation of the disconnect in the rules, 
narratives and rationales (III.C). This yields an answer to the question of how European 
citizenship matters for TCNs and for rules of engagement and cooperation in immigration, as 
well as broader reflections on the conceptual potential of European citizenship, which are taken 
up in the conclusion.  
II  The Status of TCNs in the EU: Competing Rules and Narratives 
A  Rule Frames and Purposes 
European Citizenship  
European citizenship has at first sight little bearing on the admission, status and rights of TCNs. 
It is an addition to national citizenship, which it follows automatically,15 and it is not an 
LQGHSHQGHQWFDWHJRU\LQWKHFRQWH[WRIHLWKHU(8RU0HPEHU6WDWHV¶LPPLJUDWLRQODZV
However, it has grounded a set of judicial and legislative rules on the admission and on the rights 
of TCN family members of European citizens who exercise their Treaty rights. It has also 
grounded some novel principles on the interpretation of 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶QDWLRQDOLW\ODZVIn this 
sense, European citizenship has brought about some novel rules affecting the condition of TCNs 
even beyond the rules of EU immigration law that are specifically addressed to TCNs.  
First of all, TCNs who are family members of migrant European citizens under article 2 of 
Directive 2004/38 enjoy a number of derivative rights. Rights of entry and residence,16 equal 
treatment, labor market access, and long-term integration17 are recognized to the TCN family 
PHPEHULQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKH(XURSHDQFLWL]HQ¶VULJKWWRIUHHPRYHPHQWXQGHU
µREMHFWLYHFRQditions of freedom and GLJQLW\¶18 Relevant TCNV¶ rights are retained even if death 
or separation come to sever the family relationship on which they are based.19 ECJ case law has 
interpreted and stretched the boundaries of relevant rights. It has clarified for instance the 
conditions for the entry and residence in a host State of spouses of migrant European citizens;20 
the conditions under which TCN family members may obtain a right of permanent residence;21 
                                                          
15
 TFEU, art. 20. 
16
 Art. 5-7, Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.04.2004, pp. 77-123. 
17
 Id., art. 24, 23 and 16(2). 
18
 Id., whereas 5. 
19
 Id., art. 12-13. 
20
 Case C-109/01, Akrich EU:C:2003:491; then revisited by Case C-127/08, Metock EU:C:2008:449. 
21
 Case C-162/09, Lassal EU:C:2010:592; Case C-244/13, Ogieriakhi EU:C:2014:2068. 
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the limits to documentary burdens that can be imposed on the TCN family member in the 
Member State of nationality of the sponsor European citizen.22 
Case law has brought European citizenship to bear even on TCN family members whose 
situations do not fall within the scope of the Citizenship Directive. The ECJ has interpreted 
Treaty provisions on European citizenship to require that the TCN parent caretaker of a minor 
European citizen be entitled to reside with her in a host Member State in order to make the 
minor¶VULJKWWRIUHHPRYHPHQWHIIHFWLYH23 As a further protection of the effectiveness of free 
movement, the CJEU has affirmed the right of a TCN family member to reside in the Member 
State of origin of the sponsor European citizen, so as to allow European citizens to continue the 
family life they may have built or developed during the exercise of free movement.24 Even in the 
absence of free movement or other cross-border links, the claim for a right to reside and work of 
a minor European FLWL]HQ¶V7&1SDUHQWFDUHWDNHUKDVWREHDFFRPPRGDWHGLIDFRQWUDU\
determination would lead to interference with the genuine substance of the European FLWL]HQ¶V
rights.25 
As a result the rules surrounding European citizenship accord protected status to a number of 
classes of TCNs: spouses of migrant citizens, partners of returning migrant citizens, parent 
caretakers of migrant minor citizens, or of non-migrant but threatened ones.26 These European 
citizenship-dependent statuses are to some extent parallel to the statuses of TCN family members 
of migrant EU workers. The latter also enjoy a privileged status under EU law.27 European 
citizenship has however gone a step further, bringing the legacy of citizenship to bear on the 
condition of relevant TCNs. While the recognition of rights to TCN family members of migrant 
workers fits clearly within the context of a market project, the condition of TCN family members 
of European citizens depends on the scope of transnational membership in the EU.28 It has to do 
with how European citizenship transforms the meaning and boundaries of national citizenship.29 
This transformation depends not only on the statuses that European citizenship entails for TCNs 
but also on the limits that European citizenship brings WRWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶power to grant and 
withdraw national citizenship. While nationality remains an exclusive competence of the 
                                                          
22
 Case C-202/13, Sean Ambrose McCarthy EU:C:2014:2450. 
23
 Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen EU:C:2004:639. 
24
 Case C-456/12, O. and B. EU:C:2014:135; also see Case C-370/90, Surinder Singh EU:C:1992:296 (construing a 
similar right for family members of migrant workers). 
25
 Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano EU:C:2011:124. Subsequent cases have qualified the Ruiz Zambrano judgment. 
See infra note 78. 
26
 For a restatement of relevant rules see Case C-40/11, Iida EU:C:2012:691. 
27
 Family members of migrant workers derive rights from Art. 10 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union. These have 
been extensively interpreted in case law, OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, pp. 1-12. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast, 
EU:C:2002:493; Case C-529/11, Alarape EU:C:2013:290; Case C-480/08, Teixeira EU:C:2010:83; Case 310/08, 
Ibrahim EU:C:2010:80. For a more restrictive application, see Case C-45/12, Hadj Ahmed EU:C:2013:390. 
28
 The distinction tracks the one between free movement as a right for workers and as a right for citizens. For a 
UHFHQWGLVFXVVLRQVHH)'H&HFFRµ)XQGDPHQWDO)UHHGRPV)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVDQGWKH6FRSHof Free Movement 
/DZ¶German Law Journal 383-406, at 386-88. 
29
 6HH5:DJQHUµ(XURSHDQ&LWL]HQVKLSRI/DVW5HVRUW0LJUDQW6WUDWHJLHVDQG&LYLF3UDFWLFHVLQWKH'DQLVK
)DPLO\8QLILFDWLRQ'LVSXWH¶SDSHUSUHSDUHGIRUWKHth International Conference of Europeanist, Boston 
Massachusetts, 22-24 March, 2012, on file with the author, at 25 (European citizenship family reunification rules as 
µFLWL]HQVKLSRIODVWUHVRUW¶IRU'DQLVKIDPLOLHVLQFOXGLQJD7&1 
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Member States,30 European citizenship case law clarifies that relevant powers must be exercised 
in compliance with EU law and taking into account, in particular, the rights and status of 
European citizens.31 Member States cannot impose additional conditions before treating as full-
fledged European citizens the nationals of other Member States;32 and they cannot denaturalize a 
citizen without considering, in a proportionality perspective, the consequences in terms of loss of 
European citizenship.33 One further status appears thus to be imbued with European citizenship 
considerations: the one of TCNs aspiring to naturalisation.  
Ultimately, European citizenship affects the condition of TCNs in a piecemeal fashion and with 
an alternation between daring and pulling back.34 It does design in the penumbra of citizenship, 
in any case, a number of status-protective rights. 
EU Common Immigration Policy and National Rules 
These European citizenship-based statuses for TCNs co-exist with a multitude of other ones, 
determined in accordance with the 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶LPPLJUDWLRQDQGQDWLRQDOLW\ODZs, and the EU 
common immigration policy. The coexistence of the latter two levels of law and policy makes 
for a complex regulatory frame.  
Under the Treaties, the EU is competent to develop a common policy on asylum, immigration 
and external borders control.35 The common policy on asylum finds implementation in a recently 
recast package of directives and regulations comprisLQJWKHµFRPPRQ(XURSHDQDV\OXP 
V\VWHP¶36  7KHFRPPRQLPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\HQFRPSDVVHVDPRQJRWKHUVµWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRU
entry and residence, and the standards on the issue by the Member States of long-term visa and 
UHVLGHQFHSHUPLWV¶37 DQGµWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHULJKWVRIWKLUGFRXQWU\QDWLRQDOVUHVLGLQJOHJDOO\LQ
D0HPEHU6WDWH¶38  
                                                          
30
 See Declaration n. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht on Nationality of a Member State.  
31
 Case C-369/90, Micheletti EU:C:1992:295; Case C-135/08, Rottmann EU:C:2010:104. 
32
 Micheletti above, n. 31.  
33
 Rottmann above, n. 31. 
34
 The definition of family members for these purposes is limited. See Directive 2004/38, above n. 16, art. 2; the 
CJEU has recently clarified new conditions for the retention of rights in case of separation and divorce. Case C-
218/14, Kuldip Singh EU:C:2015:476. 
35
 Art. 67 TFEU. 
36
 Art. 78 TFEU. Also see Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31±59; Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9±26; Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection  
OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 60±95; Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection  OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96±
116. 
37
 Art. 79 par. 2 a) TFEU. 
38
 Art. 79 par. 2 b) TFEU. 
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Under the umbrella of these Treaty provisions, the EU has adopted comprehensive policy 
programs,39 regulations,40 and a range of directives addressing specific categories of TCNs 
aspiring to entry41 and specific entitlements of admitted TCNs.42 EU level provisions remain in 
any case complementary to Member State level immigration law, which although residual in 
character, is still predominant in scope:43 in fact EU legislation often only sets shared standards 
but leaves the Member States free to legislate on the details, to adopt more favorable provisions 
or to retain pre-existing categories alongside the European ones;44 also, the Member States retain 
control on the volumes of TCNs¶ admissions.45  
The result is a multitude of statuses for TCNs in Europe. 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GRPHVWLFODZJRYHUQV
the residence rights of several classes of TCNs seeking work, family reunification, or 
humanitarian protection. However EU law has carved out, within each class, broader or narrower 
subclasses whose residence rights are EU law driven: for instance, among workers, the highly 
skilled, and among asylum seekers, those who are given either refugee status or subsidiary 
protection under relevant EU law rules.46  
                                                          
39
 See e.g. Conclusions of the 1999 European Council in Tampere   
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm>;  also see the Stockholm Programme ± An open and secure 
Europe serving and protecting the citizens, Council of the European Union, 2 December 2009, 
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/the_stockholm_programme_-
_an_open_and_secure_europe_en_1.pdf. 
40
 See e.g. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code), OJ L 105, 13.04.2006, pp. 1-32; Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 93±107. 
41
 E.g. Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155, 18.6.2009, p. 17±29; Council Directive 
2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service OJ L 375, 23.12.2004, p. 12±18; Council 
Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the 
purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289, 3.11.2005, p. 15±22 (the latter two directive have recently been merged 
into a newly adopted directive and not yet effective directive on the entry of students and researchers); Directive 
2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157, 27.5.2014, p. 1±22.  
42
 E.g. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who 
are long-term residents OJ L 16, 23.1.2004, p. 44±53; Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally 
residing in a Member State OJ L 343, 23.12.2011, p. 1±9.  
43
 In the area of freedom, security and justice, comprising the common immigration policy, competence is shared 
between the EU and the Member States, art. 4(2)(j) TFEU.  
44
 This is particularly true in the field of economic migration. See µCommunication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/50¶COM(2014) 287 final, of 
22.05.2014, available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-287-EN-F1-1.Pdf. 
45
 Art. 79(5) TFEU. 
46
 See Directive 2011/95, above n 36. Although the new TFEU provisions aim for a uniform EU status of asylum 
and subsidiary protection (TFEU art. 78), the Member States retain other distinct humanitarian migration statuses. 
See e.g. Legislative Decree 286/1998, 7HVWR8QLFRGHOOHGLVSRVL]LRQLFRQFHUQHQWLODGLVFLSOLQDGHOO¶LPPLJUD]LRQHH
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This fragmentation of statuses reflects in part an uneasy division of competence between the EU 
and the Member States beyond the Treaty rules, and an uncertain terrain for supranational 
cooperation. The design of the EU immigration policy bears indeed the legacy of its inter-
governmental origins.47 Conflicting priorities depending on geographic position and histories of 
migration, a puzzle of opt-in and opt-outs, and dualism between mutual trust and mutual 
suspicion express this inter-governmental legacy and the difficulties of supranational cooperation 
in this field.48  Cooperation has resulted, for instance, in clear, albeit highly problematic rules on 
DV\OXPVHHNHUV¶UHFHSWLRQ,49 and in swift mechanisms of recognition of enforcement decisions 
against illegal migrants.50 On the other hand, the harmonization of statuses for legal migrants has 
incurred much resistance, yielding the above mentioned plethora of statuses for TCNs, as well as 
µVRIWHU¶0HPEHU6WDWHVREOLJDWLRQV.51  
In the context of these supranational rules of different sign, fundamental rights and individual 
rights do have a place. EU law instruments explicitly refer to fundamental rights protection and 
the European courts test governmental conduct with regards to immigration against relevant 
standards.52 However protection of relevant rights represents an outer limit to the coordinated 
exercise of state power, rather than an objective of supranational coordination.53    
Supranational cooperation in the context of the EU common immigration policy thus expresses a 
sort of anomalous federalism: despite commitment to fair sharing of responsibilities among equal 
participants in a supranational system,54 and despite commitment to fundamental rights, the 
VXSUDQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQIUDPHZRUNVSULPDULO\WRXSJUDGHDQGUHLQIRUFHVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWV 
                                                          
norme sulla condizione dello straniero (Italian Immigration Act), GU n. 191, 18.08.1998, Suppl. Ord. N. 139, art. 
18. 
47
 Only with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the transfer of rules on immigration from the third to the first pillar marked 
the beginning of a shift from inter-governmentalism to supranationalism in this field.  
48
 For an overview of the opt-out regime, see S. Peers et al., EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and 
Commentary): Second Revised Edition, Volume 2: EU Immigration Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), at 26-28. On the 
delicate relation between trust and suspicion, see Case ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, 
judgment of 21 January 2011, available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-103050. 
$OVRVHH+7RQHUµ7KH/LVERQ7UHDW\DQGWKH)uture of European ImmigraWLRQDQG$V\OXP/DZ¶LQ$]RXODL and de 
Vries, above, n. 11, pp. 14-40, at 33-34. 
49
 Regulation 604/2013, above n. 367KH'XEOLQ¶VUHJXODWLRQILUVWFRXQWU\RIHQWU\FULWHULRQKDVDWWUDFWHGPXFK
criticism, while the ongoing migration crisis has proven the inadequacy of the regulation frame in both constitutional 
DQGRSHUDWLRQDOWHUPV6HH63HHUVµ7KH'XEOLQ5HJXODWLRQLVWKH(QG1LJK":KHUH6KRXOG8QDFFRPSDQLHG
&KLOGUHQ$SSO\IRU$V\OXP"¶http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/the-dublin-regulation-is-end-nigh-
where.html,. 
50
 See Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of 
third country nationals, OJ L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 34±36. 
51
 The Blue Card directive (Directive 2009/50, above, n. 41) exemplifies these softer obligations. See e.g. art. 18. 
But see Case C-491/13, Ben Alaya EU:C:2014:2187 (Member States must admit TCN students who meet 
requirements under Directive 2004/114). 
52
 See e.g. art. 3(2) Regulation 604/2013, above, n. 36; Art. 4 Regulation 656/2014, above, n. 40. Also see M.S.S., 
above, n. 48; joint Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S., EU:C:2011:865. Also see Thym, above, n. 5, at 719-721 
(EU migration policy refutes the idea of alienage without legal protection). 
53
 6HH90LWVLOHJDVµ7KH/LPLWVRI0XWXDO7UXVWLQ(XURSH¶V$UHDRI)UHHGRP6HFXULW\DQG-XVWLFH)URP
Automatic Inter-VWDWH&RRSHUDWLRQWRWKH6ORZ(PHUJHQFHRIWKH,QGLYLGXDO¶Yearbook of European Law  
319-72 (on the balance between state interests and individual rights in the AFSJ). 
54
 Art. 80 TFEU. Also see Stockholm Programme, above, n. 39. 
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already clearly set through national level immigration laws;55 inter-state loyalty is selective and 
contingent;56 and while formally protected through the fundamental rights frame the interests of 
individual denizens are ultimately entrusted to  a puzzle of overlapping statuses.  
While there is no supranational frame of cooperation for access to nationality, the coexistence of 
28 different nationality laws adds to the puzzle of TCNV¶ statuses. For instance, the TCN highly 
skilled workers, or the TCN students, whose statuses are harmonised under EU law, further 
divide into TCN highly skilled workers in Belgium, Spain, Poland or else; and into TCN students 
in the Netherlands, Germany or Italy or else. Their paths to citizenship differ, and their 
respective spaces of action are not as borderless as the ones of birth-right citizens.57  
Despite a common name, thus, TCNs¶ statuses are multiple in the EU. Both European citizenship 
and its rules on the one hand, and the Member States and EU rules on immigration and 
nationality on the other one, contribute to generate this multitude. There is a difference in focus 
and purpose between the European citizenship rules, and the immigration and nationality ones. 
$OEHLWZLWKOLPLWVDQGFRQGLWLRQVWKDWWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW0HPEHU6WDWHV¶SUHIHUHQFHVWhe former 
tend to be right-enhancing for TCNs: they open up facilitated routes for their inclusion, based on 
consideration of TCNs¶ and European citizenV¶LQGLYLGXDOLQWHUHVWV. The latter are rather centered 
on allocating independent and coordinated state interests:  they preserve a system of selective 
inclusion and enforceable exclusionZKHUHWKH7&1V¶LQGLYLGXDOLQWHUHVWVZRUNDVDOLPLWWR
governance rather than as a purpose for its exercise.  
This contrast that blinks through the rules becomes prominent in the narratives that develop 
through their interpretation and application on the part of courts, administrators, policy makers. 
These narratives illustrate further the character of the process of TCNs¶ inclusion in Europe; that 
is, the process through which TCNs acquire a status of partial or full legal membership through 
either residence or nationality. 
B The Narratives 
The Rights Narrative 
A first narrative unravels through the reasoning and the dicta in ECJ judgments interpreting 
European citizenship-dependent rules on the status of TCNs. This first narrative emphasizes that 
the Member States, albeit competent to decide on nationality matters, retain limited discretion in 
this field, in light of European citizenship; that, in some instances inclusion descends from 
European citizenship as a right and 0HPEHU6WDWHV¶GLVFUHWLRQLQJUDQWLQJRUGHQ\LQJULJKWVRI
residence to TCNs is accordingly limited also in this respect; and finally that European 
citizenship has a substance of its own, which may trigger relevant rights to inclusion. 
                                                          
55
 See Mitsilegas, above, n. 51, at 320-22.  
56
 As shown by contemporary debates on resettlement and relocation plans for refugees. For an overview see 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/the-new-eu-migration-agenda-takes-shape.html (last visited 27 Jul. 
2015); also see Communication from the Commission: Third Report on Relocation and Resettlement, 18 May 2016, 
COM(2016) 360, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-
implementation-package/docs/20160518/communication_third_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf (last 
visited 24 May 2016). 
57
 See F. Strumia, Supranational Citizenship and the Challenge of Diversity ± Immigrants, Citizens and Member 
States in the EU (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), at 258-266. 
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Limited Governmental Discretion in Nationality Matters 
According to the rights narrative, European citizenship limits governmental discretion in making 
determinations on nationality. In the context of these latter decisions, indeed, the rights of 
European citizens cannot be disregarded. The idea that EU law represented a limit to Member 
6WDWHV¶GHFLVLRQVRQWKHJUDQWDQGZLWKGUDZDORIQDWLRQDOLW\KDVHFKRHGWKURXJKRXWECJ case law 
ever since the Micheletti case.58 The Rottmann judgment,59 concerning the denaturalisation 
proceedings in Germany of an Austrian national who had acquired German nationality through 
fraudFODULILHVWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK(XURSHDQFLWL]HQV¶ULJKWVOLPLW0HPEHU6WDWHV¶SRZHUVLQWKLV
field. Rottmann had lost Austrian nationality in acquiring the German one and would thus have 
remained stateless following his denaturalisation in Germany. The referring German court asked 
the ECJ whether EU law required a Member State to refrain from denaturalizing a national if 
denaturalisation would have caused loss of European citizenship and statelessness.60 The ECJ 
replied that EU law requires, on the part of national authorities, an assessment of proportionality 
of the relevant decision in light of the consequences of denaturalisation for thHFLWL]HQ¶VDQGKLV
IDPLO\¶VVWDWXVDQGULJKWVXQGHU(8ODZ61 European citizens have, in other words, a right to 
inclusion that decisions on grant and withdrawal of nationality must take into account. 
In the words of Advocate General Maduro, writing the opinion for the case, 
³LIWKHVLWXDWLRQFRPHVZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI&RPPXQLW\ODZWKHH[HUFLVHE\WKH0HPEHU6WDWHVRI
their retained powers cannot be discretionary. It is subject to the obligation to comply with 
&RPPXQLW\UXOHV´62  
In the words of the CourW³the Member States have the power to lay down the conditions for the 
DFTXLVLWLRQDQGORVVRIQDWLRQDOLW\>«@WKHH[HUFLVHRIWKDWSRZHULQVRIDUDVLWDIIHFWVWKHULJKWV
FRQIHUUHGDQGSURWHFWHGE\WKHOHJDORUGHURIWKH8QLRQ>«@LVDPHQDEOHWRMXGLFial review 
FDUULHGRXWLQWKHOLJKWRI(XURSHDQ8QLRQODZ´63 
Inclusion through Residence as a Right 
Conferral and withdrawal of nationality is not the only power that the Member States can no 
longer exercise in a discretionary fashion in light of European citizenship. The case law 
LQWHUSUHWLQJ7&1IDPLO\PHPEHUV¶ULJKWVXQGHUWKH&LWL]HQVKLS'LUHFWLYHDQd under the Treaty 
provisions on European citizenship tends to treat recognition of a residence status to relevant 
TCNs as a right they can claim, rather than as a concession they may receive at the discretion of 
the authorities of the relevant Member State.64  
Breach of relevant rights on the part of a Member State may give rise to state liability. In 
December 2014, the Irish High Court condemned the Irish State to pay damages to Mr. 
                                                          
58
 Micheletti,  above, n. 31, para 10. 
59
 Rottmanni¸ above, n. 31. 
60
 Id. para 35. 
61
 Id. para 54-56. 
62
 Rottmann, above, n. 31, (Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro) EU:C:2009:588, para 20. 
63
 Micheletti, above, n. 29, para 48. 
64
 See e.g. O and B, above, n. 24, para 56; Sean Ambrose McCarthy, above, n. 22, para 33; Ruiz Zambrano, above, n. 
23, para 45. 
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Ogieriakhi, a Nigerian national, for having wrongfully denied his right to permanent residence in 
Ireland under the Citizenship Directive, as the spouse of a EU national.65 Mr. Ogieriakhi had lost 
his job as a result and sued the Irish State for damages.66 The Irish Court of Appeals 
VXEVHTXHQWO\UHYHUWHGWKH+LJK&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWon the ground that the High Court had not 
properly applied the test for state liability.67 +RZHYHUWKHQDUUDWLYHZHDYHGLQWKH+LJK&RXUW¶V
MXGJPHQWDQGLQWKH&-(8¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHTXHVWLRQVWKDWWKH+LJK&RXUWUHIHUUHGWRLWLQWKH
course of the first LQVWDQFHSURFHHGLQJFDVWOLJKWRQWKHQDWXUHRI7&1V¶ULJKWVWRLQFOXVLRQ 
In referring to the CJEU, the Irish High Court aimed at clarifying whether residence in a host 
Member State while separated from the sponsor European citizen spouse counted towards 
achievement of the right to permanent residence under the Citizenship Directive.68 In responding 
LQWKHDIILUPDWLYHWKH(&-KLJKOLJKWHGWKHULJKWV¶QDWXUHRI0U2JLHULDNKL¶VFODLPWRSHUPDQHQW
residence under the directive: he had to be regarded, in the ZRUGVRIWKHFRXUWµDVKDYLQJ
acquired a right to permanent residence¶XQGHUWKHUHOHYDQWSURYLVLRQV69 The Irish High Court 
referred to this very passage of the ECJ judgment to support its own determination that Mr. 
2JLHULDNKLµKDGEHFRPHHQWLWOHGWRSHUPDQHQWUHVLGHQFHLQ,UHODQG¶70 
Entitlement of the TCN equals limited discretion for the host Member State: the Irish High Court 
noted that under the relevant provisions of the Citizenship Directive, no discretion whatsoever 
was left to Ireland.71 Having disregarded the limits of its own discretion contributed, in the view 
of the High Court, to make the Irish government liable to Mr. Ogieriakhi.72 While the Court of 
$SSHDOVGLVPLVVHGWKH+LJK&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJRQGLVFUHWLRQDQGWKHWKH+LJK&RXUW¶VUXOHLQWKLs 
respect thus did not survive,73 the underpinning narrative on a right to inclusion does.  
Even if it is in principle just an addition to nationality, European citizenship triggers a range of 
inclusion rights: rights to remain included for European citizens; and rights to become included 
for TCNs.  European citizenship reveals thus a substance of its own, which constrains Member 
6WDWHV¶SRZHUDQGGLVFUHWLRQLQDGPLQLVWHULQg admission and naturalisation. 
The Substance of European Citizenship as a Trigger for the Right to Inclusion 
The very substance of European citizenship may become, at times, the source of rights of 
inclusion. This was the case in the 2010 Ruiz Zambrano judgment.74 The ECJ resorted to the 
substance of European citizenship to ground the entitlement of a TCN to reside and work in 
Belgium as the father care-taker of two Belgian-born and Belgian national children.  
                                                          
65
 High Court of Ireland, Ogieriakhi -v- Minister for Justice and Equality & ors (No.2), [2014] IEHC 582, judgment 
of 22 December 2014, available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2013/H133.html.  
66
 Id. para 25, and 1-2 (Ogieriakhi brought the action after naturalizing in Ireland). 
67 Irish Court of Appeals, Ogieriakhi -v- Minister for Justice and Equality & ors, [2016] IECA 46, judgment of 26 
February 2016, available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2016/CA46.html. 
68
 Ogieriakhi (ECJ), above, n. 19, para 25. 
69
 Id. para 47. 
70
 Ogieriakhi (High Court of Ireland), above, n. 57, para 12. 
71
 Id. para 48. 
72
 Excess of discretion is one factor in determining a serious infringement of law for purposes of state liability. Id. 
para 47-48. Also see Case C-46/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur EU:C:1996:79 para 55-58.  
73
 Ogieriakhi (Irish Court of Appeals), above, n. 67, para 19. 
74
 Ruiz Zambrano, above, n. 25. 
 14 
 
µArticle 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the 
Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status 
as citizens of the Union. A refusal to grant a right of residence to a third country national with 
dependent minor children in the Member State where those children are nationals and reside, 
>«@KDVVXFKDQHIIHFW¶75 
3URWHFWLRQRIWKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶V(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLSZKLFKZRXOGKDYHEHHQ
harmed had they been compelled to leave the European Union with their father, triggered their 
IDWKHU¶VULJKWWRLQFOXVLRQ76 Hailed as revolutionary for its dispensing with cross-border elements 
in applying European citizenship,77 the innovative potential of the decision has actually been 
tamed in subsequent cases: the Court has been reluctant to accommodate any of the TCNV¶ 
claims subsequently brought in reliance on Ruiz Zambrano, and has qualified the doctrine from 
various perspectives.78  
In this sense Ruiz Zambrano may appear as the last indulgence before the Court adopted a more 
sober and cautious approach to the rights of European citizenship.79 The substance doctrine, 
however, yields an important and potentially enduring legacy for the rights narrative of 
inclusion: it suggests that there is a substantive core to the rights of European citizenship, which 
may dictate the overruling of regular admission requirements and procedures for a TCN, and 
yield an independent right to inclusion.80 Despite the vagueness of the relevant rule, the doctrine 
strengthens and confirms a commitment to individual rights in the inclusion narrative developed 
around European citizenship.81 This challenges some of the main tenets of a competing narrative 
on immigration and naturalisation that rather focuses on discretion. 
 
                                                          
75
 Id., para 42-43. 
76
 Id., para 42-45. 
77
 See '.RFKHQRYµ$5HDO(XURSHDQ&LWL]HQVKLS$1HZ-XULVGLFWLRQ7HVW$1RYHO&KDSWHULQWKH'HYHORSPHQW
RIWKH8QLRQLQ(XURSH¶Columbia Journal of European Law 55-109, at 58-59; also see Ruiz Zambrano, 
above, n.  25, Opinion of AG Sharpston EU:C:2010:560; ./HQDHUWVµ&LYLV(XURSeus Sum: from the Cross-Border 
/LQNWRWKH6WDWXVRI&LWL]HQRIWKH8QLRQ¶FMW-Online Journal on Free Movement of Workers within the 
European Union 6-17, at 7-8. 
78
 The court has indicated that the doctrine is exceptional in character. See Case C-256/2011, Dereci 
EU:C:2011:734; Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy EU:C:2011:277; it does not cover lesser interferences such as 
with the mere desire to keep a family together in a given Member State. See Joint Cases 356/11 and 357/11, O, S 
EU:C:2012:776, para 52; Case C-87/12, Ymeraga EU:C:2013:291, para 38. Also see Case C-86/12, Alokpa 
EU:C:2013:645.  
79 See Case C-333/13, Dano EU:C:2014:2358; Case C-67/14, Alimanovic (8&$OVRVHH'7K\Pµ7KH
(OXVLYH/LPLWVRI6ROLGDULW\5HVLGHQFH5LJKWVRIDQG6RFLDO%HQHILWVIRU(FRQRPLFDOO\,QDFWLYH8QLRQ&LWL]HQV¶
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 17-50. 
80
 )RUIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVRIWKLVFDVHVHH)6WUXPLDµ5XL]=DPEUDQR¶V4XLHW5HYROXWLRQ'D\VWKDW0DGHWKH
,PPLJUDWLRQ&DVHRI2QH'HSULYHG:RUNHULQWRWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&DVHRI7ZR3UHFDULRXV&LWL]HQV¶LQ)1LFROD 
and  B. Davies (eds.), EU Law Stories: Comparative and Contextual Histories of European Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
81
 On the role of European citizenship for individual rights protection see D. .RFKHQRYµ7KH&LWL]HQVKLS3DUDGLJP¶
(2012-13) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 196-225EXWVHH(6SDYHQWDµ(DUQHG&LWL]HQVKLS± 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ8QLRQ&LWL]HQVKLSWKURXJKLWV6FRSH¶LQD. Kochenov (ed.), Citizenship and Federalism in Europe: 
the Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) (for a point of view on how European citizenship may 
be seen as impoverishing rather than enriching its beneficiaries). 
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The Discretion Narrative 
The interpretation and application of EU and national rules on immigration and of national rules 
on naturalisation on the part of courts, administrators and policy makers yields a second narrative 
on the inclusion of TCNs in the EU. This second narrative LV0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ focused, even 
though EU laws and policies developed within the frame of supranational cooperation in the 
context of the EU common immigration policy also feed into it, as do the CJEU judgments 
interpreting EU immigration law.82  
This narrative emphasizes state discretion rather than individual rights. Discretion of national 
authorities in making decisions on inclusion of TCNs, whether as residents or as nationals, is a 
first theme in this narrative. A further theme is integration: inclusion of a TCN, as a resident or 
as a national, requires a measure of integration into the social and cultural community of a 
specific Member State. Both themes are ultimately a reminder of the sovereign prerogatives of 
states, which retain the power to guard their borders and administer inclusion and exclusion.   
Discretionary Inclusion 
'LVFUHWLRQLQIRUPVVHYHUDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQVRQLQFOXVLRQDQGH[FOXVLRQDW0HPEHU6WDWHV¶OHYHOIt 
is built into criteria for the grant of visas and residence permits under both national and EU law, 
and transpires from the language in which relevant requirements are expressed. The UK 
Immigration Rules,83 for instance, clarify that  
µ$SHUVRQZKRLVQHLWKHUD%ULWLVKFLWL]HQQRUD&RPPRQZHDOWKFLWL]HQZLWKWKHULJKWRIDERGH
nor a person who is entitled to enter or remain in the United Kingdom by virtue of the provisions 
of the 2006 EEA Regulations requires leave to enter the United KLQJGRP¶84 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµOHDYHWRHQWHU¶UHPLQGVWKDWHQWU\LVDJUDQWHGFRQFHVVLRQRIWKHDXWKRULWLHVHYHQ
when relevant requirements are met. Terminology used in the guidance on the Tier 1 
(Entrepreneur) visa confirms this idea of concession.85 In clarifying the conditions for obtaining 
WKHUHOHYDQWYLVDWKHJXLGDQFHUHIHUVLQIDFWUHSHDWHGO\WRQRWLRQVRIµOHDYHWRHQWHU¶µOHDYHWR
UHPDLQ¶µJUDQWRIOHDYH¶µSHUPLVVLRQWRVWD\¶86 Similarly, the Italian Immigration Act lists the 
conditions according tRZKLFKDIRUHLJQHUµPD\EHDOORZHGWRVWD\¶87  
The Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle has made the point clear in a judgment interpreting the 
Belgian law on the residence of foreigners: grant of a residence permit under relevant provisions 
³constitue une faveur et non un droit´88 
                                                          
82
 See e.g. Ben Alaya, above, n. 51, para 51; Case C-502/2010, Mangat Singh EU:C:2012:636; Case C-571/10, 
Kamberaj EU:C:2012:233. 
83
 Home Office, Visas and Immigration Operational Guidance Collection, Immigration Rules,available at  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-rules>. 
84
 Id. para 7. 
85
 Guidance on Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) visa, available at  <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-
application-for-uk-visa-as-tier-1-entrepreneur>. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Italian Immigration Act, above, n. 46, art. 4. 
88
 Cour Constitutionnelle (Belgian Constitutional Court), judgment of 26 September 2013, n.123, available at 
http://www.const-court.be/public/f/2013/2013-123f.pdf, at 7.  
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Even beyond admission to residence, discretion is an important element in the context of 
naturalisation processes.89 Under the nationality law of several Member States, competent 
authorities retain a margin of discretion in deciding on the opportunity of the grant of citizenship, 
even when legal requirements are satisfied. The naturalisation stories of Lassana Bathily in 
France and of Rani Pushpa in Italy provide a WHOOLQJH[DPSOH/DVVDQD¶VLQFOXVLRQVWRU\WRRND
sudden turn following the dramatic events in Paris in which he had distinguished himself. The 
French Ministry of the Interior at this point exercised its discretion to accelerate /DVVDQD¶V 
application for French citizenship, which had been pending since 2011.90 In the case of Rani 
Pushpa, discretion cut the other way: an Italian mayor decided that poor Italian skills had to 
prevent Rani from taking an oath on the Italian constitution, even if she had complied with all 
legal requirements for naturalisation.91 The competent prefetto (representative of the Ministry of 
the Interior), in overruling the PD\RU¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKHODWWHUKDGHQWDLOHGD
misuse of discretion.92  
Case law on the review of naturalisation decisions both confirms and justifies governmental 
discretion as an element of the inclusion process. The Italian Consiglio di Stato (Council of 
State), for instance, has repeatedly held that the grant of nationality is the result of a highly 
discretionary evaluation on the part of the administrative authorities.93 The scope of this 
discretion is clarified in a 2007 memorandum of the Ministry of the Interior on the interpretation 
of Italian citizenship law: 
³Administrative discretion in the grant of Italian citizenship encompasses the assessment of the 
foreiJQHU¶VIDPLO\DQGVRFLDOOLIH>«@DVZHOODVWKHDXWKHQWLFLW\RIKLVDVSLUDWLRQWREHFRPHDQ
,WDOLDQFLWL]HQ>«@´94 
The discretion tale suggests WKDWWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶PD\OHJLWLPDWHO\JXDUGWKHERXQGDULHVRI
their national communities. A second theme corroborates this impression: inclusion requires 
integration.  
Integration in a National Community 
Social and economic integration have become, over the course of the last decade, a preliminary 
requirement in several Member States for a TCN to obtain or maintain a residence permit. 
France, Italy, Austria and Luxembourg, for instance, require that entrants sign an integration 
                                                          
89
 See e.g. Nuove Norme sulla Cittadinanza, Law  no. 91 of 1992, Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 38, 15.02.1992, art. 9. Also 
see Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, µGranting Nationality of the Czech Republic¶DYDLODEOHDW 
<http://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/article/granting-nationality-of-the-czech-republic.aspx>.  
90
 See http://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/Lassana-Bathily-est-devenu-francais. 
91
 See http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2015/03/01/sindaco-nega-cittadinanza_n_6778770.html  Also see Italian 
Citizenship Act, above, n. 89. Language knowledge is not a legal requirement for Italian citizenship, although it is 
DQHOHPHQWWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWLQWKHDXWKRULWLHV¶GLVFUHWLRQDU\HYDOXDWLRQ 
92
 See http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita-
alla_fine_ha_vinto_rani_pushpa_cittadina_italiana_anche_se_non_sa_l_italiano_19834.html.  
93
 See Consiglio di Stato (Italian Council of State), Judgment no. 3006/2011, of 20 May 2011, available at 
https://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/cdsintra/cdsintra/AmministrazionePortale/DocumentViewer/index.html?ddocname=EYYV6ADYI
O7GVOXTUZXQQSEVWI&q=.  
94
 Italian Ministry of the Interior, µMemorandum K.60.1 of 5 January 2007¶DYDLODEOHDW
http://www.meltingpot.org/IMG/pdf/circolare_ministero_interno_citadinanza_-_linee_interpretative.pdf. 
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agreement with the State, under whose terms they undertake to attend integration courses and 
activities, and commit to the achievement of set integration objectives.95  
In the wording of relevant agreements, integration requirements are a preparation of the foreigner 
to live in the host community and respect its values. According to the preamble to the Italian 
integration agreement, for instance:  
³,QWHJUDWLRQPHDQLQJDSURFHVVGHVLJQHGWRSURPRWHWKHFRH[LVWHQFHRI,WDOLDQFLWL]HQV
and foreign nationals legally residing in the country, is based on mutual commitment to 
participate in the economic, social and cultural life, under the values enshrined in the 
,WDOLDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQ>«@LQRUGHUWREHLQWHJUDWHGIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOVDUHUHTXLUHGWR>«@
respect share and promote the democratic values of freedom, equality and solidarity that 
are at the basis of the Italian Republic´96 
Other Member States have gone a step further and introduced requirements that applicants for a 
residence permit begin a process of integration even before admission into the host State. This is 
the case in the Netherlands, under the terms of the Civic Integration Act implemented in 2007. 97 
Several categories of TCNs applying for a residence permit in the Netherlands have to pass a 
civic integration test at the competent Dutch Embassy prior to obtaining the permit. 98  
If a measure of integration must be proven, in many Member States, already to qualify for first 
admission, integration requirements play an even more pervasive role in the context of TCNs¶ 
naturalisation as nationals of a Member State.99 The latest reforms of EU nationality laws 
witness to their increasing diffusion. Similar requirements have been introduced in the 
Luxembourg nationality law with a 2007 reform;100 in the new Czech nationality law, effective 
                                                          
95
 For France see &RGHGHO¶HQWUpHHWGXVHMRXUGHVHWUDQJHUVHWGXGURLWG¶DV\OH, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&dateTexte=20160525, art. 
311-19 ; for Italy, Italian Immigration Act, above, n. 46, art. 4-bis; for Austria, Bundesgesetz über die Niederlassung 
und den Aufenthalt in Österreich (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz - NAG), para 14, available at 
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20004242>; also see 
Integration Agreement, available at < http://www.migration.gv.at/en/living-and-working-in-austria/integration-and-
citizenship/integration-agreement.html#c2563>. For Luxembourg, /RLGXGpFHPEUHFRQFHUQDQWO¶DFFXHLOHW
O¶LQWpJUDWLRQGHVpWUDQJHUVDX*UDQG-Duché de Luxembourg, available at  
<http://eli.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2008/12/16/n5>; Règlement grand-ducal du 2 septembre 2011 fixant les 
FRQGLWLRQVG¶DSSOLFDWLRQHWPRGDOLWpVG¶H[pFXWLRQUHODWLYHVDXFRQWUDWG¶DFFXHLOHWG¶LQWpJUDWLRQ, available at 
<http://eli.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rgd/2011/09/02/n5>.  
96
 See template Italian integration agreement, available at  
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.interno.it/dipim/export/sites/default/it/assets/accordi_integrazione/0185_Accor
do_di_Integrazione_Inglese.pdf.  
97
 See Wet Inburgering Buitenland, 15 March 2006, available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020611/2014-03-
29. 
98
 See Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Civic Integration, <https://ind.nl/EN/individuals/residence-
wizard/other-information/civic-integration> (last visited 28 Jul. 2015); also see Kostakopoulou, above, n. 14, at 933-
934; Orgad, above, n. 14, at 63. 
99
 For an overview, see Strumia, Supranational Citizenship, above, n. 57, at 64-79. 
100
 Loi du 23 octobre 2008 sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise, Memorial n. 158 of 27 October 2008, available at 
http://eli.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2008/10/23/n1. 
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as of January 2014;101 and in the Belgian Code of Nationality, reformed in 2012.102 
Parliamentary debates surrounding the latter reform shed light on the narrative underpinning 
such requirements of integration. According to one of the members of the Belgian Parliament, 
WKHDVSLUDWLRQWREHFRPHFLWL]HQRIDQDWLRQLPSOLHVWKHGHVLUH³WRVKDUHWKHYDOXHVRIWKHQDWion 
RQHZDQWVWREHORQJWRWRLQWHJUDWHLQLWVLGHQWLW\DQGWRPDNHVXFKGHVLUHNQRZQWRHYHU\ERG\´
As a result, nationality policy requires  
³DQLQ-depth, sincere reflection on the necessary link between the acquisition of 
nationality in a country, and the national community which is at the basis of such 
FRXQWU\´,WUHTXLUHV³WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHFRQFHUQHGSHUVRQ¶VLQWHQWLRQWRLQWHJUDWHLQ
the country of residence, and granting nationality upon successful completion of this 
LQWHJUDWLRQ´103 
Integration requirements in European nationality laws encompass language knowledge, civic and 
social integration, acquaintance with history and constitutional values, or even assimilation. The 
French &RQVHLOG¶État relied precisely on lack of assimilation, in a landmark 2008 judgment, to 
uphold rejection of the naturalisation application of the Moroccan wife of a French national, who 
habitually wore a niqab:104 
³>0PH$@KDVHQJDJHGLQDUDGLFDOSUDFWLFHRIKHUUHOLJLRn, incompatible with the 
HVVHQWLDOYDOXHVRIWKH)UHQFKFRPPXQLW\>«@DVDUHVXOWVKHGRHVQRWFRPSO\ZLWKWKH
DVVLPLODWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWLQDUWRIWKHFLYLOFRGH´105 
Even when integration is not a named requirement under applicable nationality laws, it is often 
part of the concrete assessment of administrative authorities. So much explains the Italian 
Consiglio di StatoLQZKRVHZRUGVUHOHYDQWDXWKRULWLHVPXVWDVFHUWDLQ³ZKHWKHUWKHIRUHLJQHU
has been successfully integrated in Italy, so that he can be said to belong to the national 
FRPPXQLW\´106  
The national rush towards integration requirements also has a EU level counterpart. TCNs¶ 
integration has been a EU priority ever since the European Council in Tampere,107 re-
emphasized, most recently, in the 2(XURSHDQ$JHQGDRQ0LJUDWLRQZKLFKPDNHVµHIIHFWLYH
LQWHJUDWLRQ¶RQHof the priorities for a new policy on legal migration.108 Recognition to the EU, 
                                                          
101
 Act 186/2013 on Citizenship of the Czech Republic, Collection of Acts No. 77/2013, 1774, para 14-15 (English 
summary available at < http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/docs/bibliographyFiles/CZR_English%20summary%20of%20Act%20186_2013_Consulate%20Gene
ral.pdf>. 
102
 LoLPRGLILDQWOH&RGHGHODQDWLRQDOLWpEHOJHDILQGHUHQGUHO¶DFTXLVLWLRQGHODQDWLRQDOLWpEHOJHQHXWUHGXSRLQW
GHYXHGHO¶LPPLJUDWLRQ, 4 December 2012, Moniteur Belge 393 of 14 December 2012, 79998-80008, available at 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=2012120404. 
103
 See Galant, in Full report of the plenary seating of the Chamber of Representatives of 24 October 2012, para 
05.09, available at < http://www.lachambre.be/doc/PCRI/PDF/53/ip108.pdf>. 
104
 See &RQVHLOG¶eWDW (French Council of State), Faiza M judgment n. 286798 of 2008, of 27 June 2008, available at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT000019081211. 
105
 Id. 
106
 Italian Council of State, judgment 3006/2011, above, n. 93. 
107
 Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, above, n. 11. 
108
 µ&RPPXQLFDWLRQIURPWKH&RPPLVVLRQWRWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWWKH&RXQFLOWKH(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLFDQG
6RFLDO&RPPLWWHHDQGWKH&RPPLWWHHRIWKH5HJLRQVRQD(XURSHDQ$JHQGDRQ0LJUDWLRQ¶, COM(2015) 240 final, 
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with the Treaty of Lisbon, of a precise competence in matters of TCNV¶ integration has opened 
up further options for EU intervention in this field.109 Several policy initiatives have contributed 
in the last decade to a EU integration policy: WKH&RXQFLO¶VCommon Basic Principles for 
Immigrant Integration;110 WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V2005 Common Agenda for Integration;111 the EU 
website on integration and the Integration Fund;112 and the 2011 Common Agenda for the 
integration of Third Country Nationals.113  
If the focus of these policy programmes is promoting genuine participation of migrants at the 
economic and social level,114 EU legislation adopted as part of the common immigration policy, 
as well as its interpretation on the part of the CJEU, rather reflect WKH0HPEHU6WDWHV¶DGRSWLRQRI
integration requirements as tools of immigration control. Both the EU Long Term Residence 
Directive115 and the EU Family Reunification Directive116 make room for the application of 
integration requirements on the part of the Member States.117 In particular, in interpreting the 
latter, the CJEU has taken to some extent a middle way betweHQULJKWV¶QDUUDWLYHDQGGLVFUHWLRQ
narrative. For instance, in interpreting the Family Reunification directive, the Court has clarified 
that the directive imposes precise obligations on the Member States with regard to family 
reunification, which mirror into individual rights for TCNs.118 However, the Court has then 
readily upheld provisions of the directive having the effect of reinstating a margin of 
appreciation for the Member States so as to allow them to apply integration requirements, in 
certain circumstances, before granting family reunification.119 The Court has recognized, in this 
respect, the legitimate interest of the Member States in considering their competing interests 
before granting entry and residence rights to a TCN family member.120 The stance of EU 
                                                          
of 13.05.2015, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/lietuva/documents/power_pointai/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.p
df, at III.4. 
109
 Art. 79(4) TFEU. 
110
 (XURSHDQ&RXQFLOµ&RPPRQ%DVLF3ULQFLSOHVRQ,PPLJUDQWV,QWHJUDWLRQ3ROLF\¶1RYHPEHU available at  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf>.  
111
 µ&RPPRQ$JHQGDIRU,QWHJUDWLRQ 
Framework for the Integration of Third-&RXQWU\1DWLRQDOVLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶&20ILQDO
September, 2005; available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0389. 
112
 Cf. <http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/>. The European Integration Fund (EIF) had a budget of EUR 825m for the 
period 2007-2013. For 2014-2020 it has been replaced by the Asylum, Immigration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 
with a budget of ca EUR 3.1 million. 
113
 µ(XURSHDQ$JHQGDIRUWKH,QWHJUDWLRQRI7hird-&RXQWU\1DWLRQDOV¶, COM(2011) 455 final, of 20 July 2011, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/110720/1_en_act_part1_v10.pdf. 
114
 Id. 
115 Directive 2003/109, above, n. 42. 
116 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification  OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 
12±18. 
117
 E.g. Directive 2003/109, above, n. 42, art. 5(2); directive 2003/86, above, n. 117 art. 7(2). Also see Wallace 
Goodman, above, n. 12. 
118 Case C-540/03, Parliament v Council, EU:C:2006:429, par. 60; Case C-578/08, Chakroun EU:C:2010:117, par 
41.  
119 Parliament v Council, above, n. (118), par. 61-62; Case C-153/14, K. & A., EU:C:2015:453.  
120 Parliament v Council, above, n. (118), par. 62 and 68. But see K. & A., n. 119, par. 52-54, where the Court in 
deciding on the admissibility of integration requirements for spouses in the context of family reunification, has 
emphasized that relevant integration requirements must be genuinely aimed at facilitating the establishment of 
connections in the host MembHU6WDWHRQWKHSDUWRIWKHVSRQVRU¶VIDPLO\PHPEHU 
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LPPLJUDWLRQODZDVZHOODVWKH&-(8¶VDSSURDFKWRLWVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQUHFRQILUPWKXVWKDWEH\RQG
the sphere of EU citizenship, a narrative of legitimate national closure, and of discretionary 
inclusion, prevails both at the national and at the supranational level.   
C From Competing Narratives to Contrasting Rationales 
The contrast between individual rights protection and accommodation of state priorities, which 
surfaced in the rules on European citizenship and on immigration and nationality respectively, 
ripens into a full-fledged disconnect throughout the competing narratives. According to the 
discretion narrative, inclusion of a TCN, whether as a resident or as a citizen, ultimately depends 
on the choice of national authorities and is not a right. While WKHULJKWV¶ narrative revolving 
around European citizenship emphasizes that inclusion through residence, in a number of 
situations linked to European citizenship, is a right; and that decisions on inclusion through 
nationality have to respect EU law and the rights of European citizens. This limits the discretion 
of national authorities as well as, potentially, the bite of integration requirements that constellate 
the discretion narrative. Further, if inclusion in the discretion narrative depends on the good fit of 
the entrant in the social and cultural fabric of the host Member State, in the rights narrative 
respect for the substance of European citizenship provides an alternative driver for inclusion 
independent of integration.  
Disconnected narratives label similar situations in different ways. For instance, a rejected asylum 
seeker according to the discretion narrative may be the admissible parent caretaker of a European 
citizen according to the rights one; a national legitimately denaturalised for fraud according to 
the discretion narrative may be a wrongfully disentitled European citizen according to the rights 
one. Awkward practical results may follow. What for instance if Mr. Zambrano had been in Italy 
rather than in Belgium and he had failed to comply with the terms of his integration agreement? 
Would protection of the substance of his subsequently born European citizen child have saved 
him from expulsion?121  
It could be counter-DUJXHGWKDWWKH(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶V rules and narrative, rather than 
challenging the national ones, simply extend exceptions to the discretion frame that already exist 
in the immigration frame. Family considerations ± the argument could go- warrant deviations 
from general immigration rules,122 and European citizenship does no more than applying relevant 
considerations to TCN family members of migrant (and exceptionally also static) European 
citizens. However first, family considerations only go so far in immigration law and policy.123 
Second, European citizenship tends to emancipate the position of the TCNs it affects from family 
                                                          
121
 Under the Italian Immigration Act, TCNs who hold a residence permit for family purposes or are family 
members of European citizens are not subject to the requirement to sign an integration agreement. See Italian 
Immigration Act, above, n. 46, art. 4-ELV+RZHYHULWLVQRWFOHDUWKDWDSHUVRQLQ0U=DPEUDQR¶VVLWXDWLRQZRXOG
have qualified for one of these residence permits.  
122
 Family reunification is an autonomous ground for admission under most immigration laws. Further the right to 
family life under art. 8 of the ECHR, and art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights potentially work as a limit to 
state priorities in immigration matters. 
123
 See Wallace Goodman, above, n. 14 (integration programmes have turned into migration control instruments 
precisely for family reunification migrants). 
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considerations, rather embedding it into a frame of rights meant to bestow autonomous statuses 
upon their holders.124  
Ultimately, the rules and narratives of European citizenship protect a right to belong in a domain 
where national rules and narratives, as well as the rules under the EU common immigration 
policy, rDWKHUSRLQWWRZDUGVWKHVWDWH¶VSRZHUWRH[FOXGHIn this sense, the disconnect between 
these rules and narratives transposes into the European context a tension between individual 
rights and state sovereignty that is at the very heart of legal and philosophical conundrums on the 
regulation of cross-border movement.125  
Under international law, states have a right to manage their borders and to decide in their 
discretion on the admission and exclusion of aliens.126 7KHVWDWHV¶OHJDOSRZHUWRH[FOXGHILQGV
justifications in a number of arguments in political theory and philosophy: from concerns for the 
premises and functionality of state-led mechanisms of redistribution,127 to considerations of 
cultural protection and population trends.128  
On the other hand, under international law, the right of states to include and exclude finds a limit 
in the necessity to protect in certain instances overarching human rights;129 and more broadly in 
an individual right to move across borders, recognised in several international law instruments 
although subject to several conditions and limits.130 Joseph Carens traces the philosophical roots 
of an individual right to cross state borders to principles of both freedom and equality:131 free 
movement is a fundamental human freedom, which is also preliminary to many other 
freedoms;132 and it is a guarantee of equality of opportunities, which may also help reduce social 
and economic inequalities on a global scale.133 
In the EU context, this tension between individual rights and state sovereignty breaks into two 
distinct but related WHQVLRQV7KHQDUUDWLYHRI7&1V¶ULJKWVWhat EU citizenship brings about 
frames, on the one hand, a discourse of constitutional limits to the sovereign national power to 
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police borders. On the other hand, it challenges WKHQDWLRQVWDWH¶VSRZHUWRERXQGand bond 
around a shared conception of collective good. 
In the former sense the ULJKWV¶QDUUDWLYH casts limits based on fundamental individual freedoms 
against the national (and in part supranational) competence to manage borders through the 
regulation of immigration. Daniel Thym has argued that focusing on the dichotomy between 
rights and sovereignty is in part misleading in the context of the regulation of European 
immigration.134 The latter is best understood through a cosmopolitan lens ± the argument goes- 
which magnifies how the embedding of human and fundamental rights of migrants in the EU 
migration policy tames sovereignty and protects the individual right to cross borders. 135 
European citizenship, with its rules and narratives touching upon the status of TCNs, adds a 
constitutional angle to this individual right to cross (European) borders. 136 In the context of 
immigration laws and policies, individual rights to cross borders either work as boundary to a 
system otherwise premised on state power and control;137 or are the side effect of an effort at 
harmonisDWLRQRI0HPEHU6WDWHV¶UXOHV138 In the EU citizenship perspective, the TCNs¶ right to 
pass the external borders of the EU and to achieve a status of belonging within its composing 
nations challenges, albeit in a limited set of circumstances, the very competence of the Member 
States to guard their borders.139  
In the second sense, the EU citizenship narrative PRXQWV7&1V¶VXSUDQDWLRQDOULJKWVDJDLQVWWKH
power of the nation state to administer inclusion and exclusion so as to bound around a shared 
space of solidarity and redistribution. The discretion narrative is imbued with communitarian 
accents that represent an expression of the latter power. 140 The Italian Council of State suggests 
that inclusion as national citizens entails the undertaking of moral and material duties towards 
the community.141 The debate of the Belgian Parliament on the reform of Belgian nationality law 
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similarly emphasizes the link between acquisition of nationality and participation in the national 
community.142 The language of the integration agreements suggests that already when admitted 
to residence, TCNs are expected to prove their ability and commitment to undertake and fulfil 
the obligations that come with membership in a bounded national community.143 The discretion 
narrative thus preserves the boundedness of the EU Member States. 
The rights narrative on the other hand tends to un-bound the Member States. It potentially 
amplifies and perpetuates WKHµRSHQLQJHIIHFW¶WKDWVXSUDQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLSDQG(XURSHDQ
integration more in general, have been found to have on the Member States ability to articulate a 
shared notion of collective good.144 This is because the right to belong that European citizenship 
projects onto TCNs transcends national boundaries.  
Disconnected narratives thus signal deeper contrasts between, on the one hand, the Member 
6WDWHV¶UROHDVJXDUGLans of bounded national spaces (and spaces that are bounded for a reason); 
DQG(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VUROHRIWUDQVODWLQJliberal values of individual freedom and autonomy, 
equality and tolerance that are at the basis of the European integration project into precise 
citizenship rights, of free movement, equal treatment and recognition as a fellow citizen despite 
national otherness.145 These contrasts expose in turn the dilemma that immigration poses for 
European liberal democracies.146 If in managing their borders so as to protect national identities 
and the collective interest of their communities, the EU Member States compromise principles of 
autonomy, equality and tolerance, they dilute the liberal character of those very identities and 
communities.  If on thHRWKHUKDQGWKH\VXUUHQGHUWR(8FLWL]HQVKLS¶VPHQXRIVXSUDQDWLRQDO
rights, they risk endangering those identities and communities by unbounding them. 147  
While this dilemma has deeper roots than European citizenship,148 it challenges European 
FLWL]HQVKLS¶V narrative of TCNs¶ rights. It calls for a novel conception of legal, political and 
social boundaries that may justify shifting competences for border management, and protect 
supranational rights while accommodating the interests of national communities. The question 
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becomes then, whether European citizenship has the ability to back its narrative of rights with a 
credible theory of supranational boundaries. 
II EU Citizenship and EU Immigration: Reconciling Competing Narratives through 
Mutual Recognition and Demoicracy 
A EU Citizenship, National Boundaries and Mutual Recognition of Belonging 
Questions of supranational citizenship and community boundaries have several angles, and have 
been extensively explored in different literatures. In part, they have been treated as questions of 
identity, focusing on the possibility of shifting the boundaries of perceived belonging in 
Europe.149 They have also been looked at from a political angle, addressing the feasibility of 
redesigning political boundaries at the supranational level.150  This article is rather concerned 
ZLWKWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIULJKWV:KLFKERXQGDULHVVKLIWLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWK(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶V
articulation of a frame of supranational rights for second country nationals, and tangentially for 
TCNs? How do the obligations of rights¶ providers change, when the boundaries of the 
community of the entitled become supranational? And how does the supranational status of 
ULJKWV¶KROGHUVUHODWHWRthe status of national citizens? 
While the rights perspective does not exhaust, of course, the question of boundaries, addressing 
these questions may help interpret the disconnect in rules and narratives that the first part of this 
article denounced, thereby clarifying the role that EU citizenship may play in the context of EU 
immigration. 
The first-sight reality of European citizenship may inspire skeptical answers to the questions set 
above. European citizenship has been accused of being the side product of a market project. 
While it enhances and enlarges the sphere of autonomy of European economic actors, it does not 
trigger truthful reshaping of the community of solidarity that social citizenship relies upon.151 In 
the absence of a supranational welfare system that may back an effort in this sense, European 
citizenship does not offer a sustainable recipe for the Member States to work as supranational 
rights¶ providers. Nor can it sustain the level of bonding that would legitimate a supranational 
architecture of redistribution. On the contrary, LWLVDµPLVQRPHU¶WKDWWKUHDWHQV the Member 
States¶ ability to preserve their vest of social states.152 The rebounding of the national welfare 
states, and retrenchment into nationalism, which ongoing social and economic crises have 
catalysed,153 underline the shortfalls of European citizenship.  
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National rebounding protects in this sense important collective goods, of which the nation states 
remain perhaps the most effective guardians. At the same time, the very possibility for the 
Member States to push back on their role as supranational rights providers reveals the fragile and 
contingent nature of the rights of second country nationals. While the CJEU has tried to make of 
these rights DµIXQGDPHQWDOVWDWXV¶,154 they remain limited and conditional.155 In times of crisis 
they have become exposed to political resistance and to legal setbacks.156 If residence was once 
WKRXJKWWRUHSUHVHQWµWKHQHZQDWLRQDOLW\¶157 it may seem these days that national citizenship is 
back with a vengeance as the ultimate source of rights and security.158 If the supranational 
entitlements of second country nationals face such uncertain destiny, what can it be of the ones 
of TCNs? This sobering vision, while holding much truth, disregards in part the conceptual 
legacy of supranational citizenship. 
European citizenship was never meant to supersede national citizenship, either as a source of 
status, repository of identity, venue of political encounter, or container of rights.159 It has rather 
stretched European national citizenships beyond their own borders, giving them an extra-
territorial reach.160 In doing this, it has not only expanded the sphere of autonomy of individual 
national citizens, but also problematised the boundaries of their social and political spaces of 
belonging, grounding state obligations, albeit limited ones, towards those outside the core circle 
of membership.  
EuURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VSUREOHPDWLVing of national boundaries is best evident in the context of the 
law on free movement. The (XURSHDQFLWL]HQV¶ULJKWWRPRYHDQGUHVLGHLQWKHVHYHUDO0HPEHU
States entails a number of transnational components:161 the right to export benefits and 
entitlements tied to nationality to a host Member State;162 the right not to be burdened, or 
discriminated for having exercised the freedom to move;163 the right to equal treatment with 
nationals of host Member States;164 and a broader right to belong across Member State borders, 
for instance through seeing the family life one has built while exercising free movement rights 
protected upon return to a Member State of origin.165 From the perspective of the individual 
citizens, these rights signify an extension of the boundaries of their national citizenships, whose 
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content comes to reach beyond national borders while opening up a dimension of belonging also 
in other Member States.166 From the perspective of the Member States, enforcement of these 
rights implies a rule of mutual recognition of EuroSHDQFLWL]HQV¶QDWLRQDOEHORQJLQJ167  Free 
movement of European citizens entails in other words a right to belong across borders which 
mirrors into an implied obligation of mutual recognition on the part of the Member States.  
European citizenship thus declines in the domain of membership and belonging a notion of 
mutual recognition that is both a fundamental regulatory mechanism in the context of the internal 
market and the AFSJ,168 and a normative aspiration for the project of European integration.169  
Mutual recognition informs operational rules on free movement of persons: rules of recognition 
enable migrant European citizens to bring along to other Member States a number of accessories, 
IURPWKHPRUHPXQGDQHGULYHUV¶OLFHQVHV170 to the more hard earned (diplomas and 
professional qualifications),171 to the more identity-signifying (the spelling of their names).172 At 
a higher level a system of mutual recognition of national belonging represents the foundation 
stone for the architecture of free movement of European citizens: each Member State has to 
uphold without questions the determination of any other Member State as to who belongs as a 
citizen in their national community, for purposes of extending to such citizens a measure of 
belonging into its own community.173 Recognition in this sense implies a measure of trust among 
the Member States as well as among their nationals. Bonds of trust allow the opening of national 
borders and the blending of several communities of national others into a community of 
supranational citizens.174  
While it has been observed that principles applying in the field of free movement cannot be as 
easily extended to the field of immigration from third countries,175 two elements from this 
(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VUHFLSHWRJHQHUDWHEHOonging from otherness are potentially transferable to 
the domain of TCNs¶ immigration: the inclination to recognise, rather than reject diversities; and 
trust rather than suspicion as a basis for relevant decisions of inclusion and exclusion.  
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In fact these elements already apply in the context of the EU common immigration policy, only 
they apply in a flipped manner in comparison to the domain of free movement, and of the 
internal market more in general.176 Mutual recognition is a well-known rule in the context of the 
the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).177 It presides to the functioning of European 
Arrest Warrants, to the enforcement of judicial decisions in civil and criminal matters, and to the 
enforcement of expulsion decisions.178 As the list suggests, rules of mutual recognition in the 
AFSJ are functional to easing the circulation of judgments and administrative decisions, rather 
than to facilitating the movement of persons and goods.179 Similarly, mutual trust among the 
Member States is conducive to enforcement of government action.180 It rests on the presumption 
that all Member States comply with equivalent standards of fundamental rights protection, 
barring active inquiry in this respect.181 Ultimately in the context of the AFSJ rules of mutual 
recognition work to amplify the effects of governmental discretion rather than to reinforce 
individual freedoms.182  
European citizenship promises an alternative version of mutual recognition that could push back 
the balance towards individual freedoms also in the AFSJ, at least with regards to the common 
immigration policy.  This is because European citizenship works on the nature of mutual 
recognition: in the context of citizenship, it is no longer just an operational rule, a mode of 
transnational governance, and a philosophical principle.183 It becomes a norm of belonging. 
Through this norm of belonging based on mutual recognition, national boundaries change in 
texture. (XURSHDQFLWL]HQV¶VSKHUHVRIDXWRQRP\, as well as their entitlements, begin to extend 
across national borders. In this way their spaces of action and of interest as national citizens of 
differently bounded nation states become to some extent enmeshed. And similarly enmeshed 
become, by reflection, the spaces of actions of the European denizens, the TCNs. In this sense 
mutual recognition of belonging expresses, in the context of citizenship rights and statuses, 
(XURSH¶VFKDracter as a demoicratic community. 
 
B European Citizenship as Demoicratic Citizenship 
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The idea of European demoicracy entails DµXQLRQRISHRSOHVXQGHUVWRRGERWKDVVWDWHVDQGDV
FLWL]HQVWKDWJRYHUQWRJHWKHUEXWQRWDVRQH¶184 Recognition is at the basis of belonging in such a 
community of multiple demoi.  
Kalypso Nicolaïdis¶GHILQLWLRQUDLVHVDFRQFHUQfrom a citizenship perspective: whether the 
individual persons whose spheres of autonomy intersect through the exercise of supranational 
rights can turn into peoples, expressing joint political citizenship by governing together.  In other 
words, how can the µaccidental cosmopolitans¶LQWKHH\HVRI$OH[DQGHU6RPHN turn into 
demoicratic citizens?185 The question points, on the one hand, to the well-known shortcomings of 
European political citizenship,186 and to the political side of the notion of demoicracy.187 From a 
different angle, which is rather the focus here, this question links back to the argument that 
enhanced individual autonomy, bolstered by the porousness of national borders, does not reflect 
into transnational collective commitments.188 The mutual recognition content of supranational 
citizenship challenges the latter argument: recognition of individual transnational entitlements 
calls for an effort at internalising the points of view of the members of other demoi and redirects 
in part the obligations of both citizens and governments.189  In this sense, the interdependence of 
WKHFLWL]HQV¶VSKHUHVRIDXWRQRP\FUHDWHVDVSDFHWRUHQHJRWLDWHFROOHFWLYHFRPPLWPHQWV 
For such renegotiation to effectively take place, a measure of political appropriation of the 
transnational space, as well as a shared notion of collective good are needed. In the former 
respect, the austerity/non-austerity line in political discourses across Europe that have 
surrounded the sovereign debt crises may represent a burgeoning form of such appropriation.190  
In the latter respect, (XURSHDQFLWL]HQV¶DXWRQomous pursuits suggest, to some extent, a notion of 
FROOHFWLYHJRRGWKDWFXWVDFURVVQDWLRQDOERUGHUV,WLVWKHVHDUFKRIWKH(XURSHDQµJRRGOLIH¶DIWHU
all that prompts EU citizens to claim mutual recognition of their belonging through the exercise 
of free movement rights: enhanced autonomy is conducive to the pursuit of employment, 
adequate welfare protection, ultimately social inclusion.191 These are the collective goods that the 
Europeans care about.192 The obligations that supranational provision of such collective goods 
triggers IRUWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVXOWLPDWHO\H[SUHVVDVKDUHGYLVLRQRIWKHVWDWHDVWKHµSURWHFWRURI
VRPHVSDFHDZD\IURPWKHPDUNHW¶193 ([WHQVLRQRIFLWL]HQV¶DXWRQRP\points to the need for the 
Member States to exercise relevant obligations, to a certain extent, on behalf of one another, but 
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it does not put up for question the relevant role of the Member States and the need to protect 
their ability to discharge redistributive duties also in respect of static citizens.194 Eventually, it 
seems, the accidental cosmopolitanism of European citizens does express membership in a 
polity, a demoicratic one, where belonging is transferable among multiple demoi, on the ground 
that those GHPRL¶V conceptions of the common good are akin and may justify a commitment to 
no othering of their mutual members.195  
This commitment to no othering translates into a rule of mitigation in respect of the Member 
6WDWHV¶SRZHUWRLQFOXGHDQGH[FOXGH(8FLWL]HQVRU TCNs. The rule points to the Member 
6WDWHV¶VKDUHGresponsibilities as guardians of a segment of the borders of a demoicratic polity.196 
The interests of all other Member States have to be taken into account when deciding on the 
inclusion or exclusion of a TCN, whose status will have Europe-wide implications. In a 
demoicratic direction, the Italian Council of State in March 2015, in denying naturalisation to a 
TCN on grounds of public security, remarked that with Italian citizenship comes the right to 
move freely in the EU Member States.197 Thus the security interest the Italian government was 
protecting through the refusal of its nationality ±hinted the Council of State- was actually a 
shared interest that the Italian State had to defend on behalf of all the other Member States.   
 
C Bridging the Disconnect through the Demoicratic Argument 
Notions of mutual recognition of belonging and demoicracy ultimately capture the way European 
citizenship has problematised national boundaries, for second country nationals as well as, by 
reflection, for TCNs. In respect of the latter, these notions help spell out the nature of the rights 
that European citizenship brings about for TCNs, as well as the scope of the obligations that 
European citizenship imposes on Member States in respect of TCNs. As a result mutual 
recognition and demoicracy lay out a possible bridge between disconnected rules, narratives and 
rationales.  
The norm of mutual recognition suggests that TCN spouses, partners and parent caretakers 
derive from their European citizen family members a right to be included across national 
borders, even in spite of competing state priorities. This right to belong across borders suggests a 
way to reconcile rules RQ7&1V¶VWDWXVdescending of European citizenship, and of the Member 
6WDWHV¶LPPLJUDWLRQDQGQDWLRQDOLW\UHJLPHV 
The rule of mitigation that demoicratic notions of mutual trust, shared responsibility, and no 
othering suggest offers a reading key to European citizenship¶VULJKWVnarrative in turn. It may 
help apply the latter narrative to re-interpret the competing immigration and naturalisation one 
based on discretion.  
First, a mutual trust perspective suggests that the Member States in exercising their discretion in 
making inclusion and exclusion determinations, and in applying their integration requirements, 
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are called to take into account the point of view of any other directly involved Member States. 
They may have to recognize for instance determinations on residence, rights, integration 
previously made by another Member State in respect of the same TCN, or in respect of a TCN in 
the same situation.198 The logics of EurRSHDQFLWL]HQVKLSPDNHUHFRJQLWLRQRIVXFK³JUDLQV´RI
LQFOXVLRQDULJKWIRU7&1VDQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\OLPLW0HPEHU6WDWHV¶SRZHUVLQWKLVVHQVH 
Ideas of shared responsibility and no othering tame power in the context of admission and 
naturalisation also in a second direction. They remind that any Member State in administering 
inclusion and exclusion, even in respect of a TCN¶VILUVWDGPLVVLRQ, acts not only on behalf of 
itself, but on behalf of all other Member States. The right that it grants or denies to the TCN 
entails a claim, if not a right, to belong not only within its borders but across them and 
throughout the EU. For this reason, the process of granting or denying such right should 
incorporate the perspectives of other Member States, even if just potential, as well as the 
perspectives of European citizenship and its substance. The need to incorporate such 
SHUVSHFWLYHVOLPLWVRUFKDQQHOVHDFK0HPEHU6WDWH¶VGLVFUHWLRQ 
To clarify with an example, had Lassana Bathily been a resident of Spain waiting for 
naturalisation there rather than in France at the time of becoming a hero in a dramatic French 
situation, Spain would have done well, in a demoicratic perspective, to accelerate his 
naturalisation process thereby incorporating a French point of view in running its process of 
inclusion.  
8OWLPDWHO\(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶Vdemoicratic norm of belonging mitigates the tension between 
national competence to police the borders and supranational rights: sovereignty is not superseded 
by a right to move across borders, but needs to be exercised in a way conscious of the external 
implications of that right.199 ,QWKLVVHQVH(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHORJLFVRI
immigration regulation in Europe is not in terms of stripping the Member States of their powers; 
it is rather in terms of showing the Member States a way to exercise a power that stays theirs in a 
mutually conscious and mutually respectful way.200 The point thus is not harmonization of 
admission and naturalisation rules, but is rather encouraging shared understandings of those rules 
that preserve, but soften national boundaries.  
7KRVHQDWLRQDOERXQGDULHVDVGLVFXVVHGDERYHDUHQRWRQO\DQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHVWDWHV¶SROLFH
power, but they also enclose a space of redistribution of collective goods. The question then 
arises as to what the demoicracy argument demands in terms of redistribution of these collective 
goods, and in terms of their redistribution for the benefit of outsiders. In this respect, the 
argument remains indeterminate. Redistributive questions turn in significant part on concrete 
issues of welfare and tax system design that the notion of demoicracy by itself is not equipped to 
address. They also turn on the scope of existing notions of collective good. In this respect, while 
current trends re-emphasize the role of the nation state as the proper venue to configure social 
citizenship,201 as suggested earlier,202  a demoicratic conception of European citizenship 
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potentially makes room for renegotiating existing notions of collective good and of solidarity. 
According to Floris De Witte, aspirational solidarity limits the authority of the Member State in 
Europe.203 The demoicratic argument further suggests that the kernel of solidarity that a right to 
belong across borders calls for also redirects such authority. It provides a rationale to exercise it 
not only to guarantee protection of the interests of insiders, but also to protect the rights of 
outsiders, whether they are second country nationals or TCNs.  
It may be opposed to this that in the absence of supranational bonding, solidarity cannot go very 
far. However even accepting that solidarity really requires bonds, and that it cannot rather rest on 
a  VKDUHGYLVLRQRIµJRRGOLIH¶combined with awareness of the shared risk of being unable to 
DWWDLQVXFKµJRRGOLIH¶, a demoicratic polity entails its own genre of bonds. In Kalypso Nicolaïdis 
forceful words, it is a  
³mosaic of intertwined mental and physical landscapes open to each other's soft 
influences and hard laws, and bound together not by some overarching sense of common 
identity or peoplehood but by the daily practice of mutual recognition of identities, 
histories, social contracts´204  
The demoicratic argument on European citizenship faces further challenges. It may be accused of 
overstating the importance of a few scattered rules on European citizenship family members, and 
of a subtle rights narrative on inclusion that may well fade into silence. There is a question of 
feasibility: how is the rights narrative to concretely affect debates and rules on immigration in 
the EU? As well as a question of opportunity: in a climate of political unrest surrounding several 
key integration questions, including immigration,205 and at a time when EU institutional 
mechanisms are proving inadequate,206 attaching so much importance to the feeble echoes of 
European citizenship¶V tale of rights may seem utopian, if not naïve. The refugee crisis, with the 
shortcomings it has highlighted in the Common European Asylum System and the divided 
reactions it has triggered among the Member States,207 casts an additional shadow on the 
UHVLOLHQFHRIDQ\ULJKWV¶QDUUDWLYH 
In terms of feasibility, at a time when immigration has become one of the most divisive issues in 
European and national political debates, WKHVWUHQJWKRIWKH(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶VQDUUDWLYHLVin 
that it speaks directly to case workers and courts which are called to apply the rules. If resistance 
and retrenchment prevail in the political arena, where rights of migrants are cast against the 
legitimate worries of the host countries for their social cohesion and financial commitments, the 
citizenship narrative keeps alive an albeit feeble discourse on rights.  To a moderate extent, the 
rights narrative has already percolated to the national level. In Belgium, in the aftermath of the 
Zambrano judgment, and in the wake of an opinion of the Council of State, the Law on 
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Foreigners was amended to extend family reunification rights with TCN family members to 
ascendants of Belgian nationals.208 Also, provisions on denaturalisation in the reformed Code of 
Nationality were amended at the suggestion of the same Council of State to take into account the 
Rottmann judgment.209 
In terms of opportunity, it is true that the discontent currents that confront the European 
integration project have stripped European citizenship of much of its pragmatic bite. Yet the 
demoicratic argument illuminates the aspirational and exhortatory value of the concept of 
European citizenship.210 In its heyday in the 90s and early 2000s, European citizenship has 
offered a supranational platform for individual right and social protection ideals that resonate in 
DOO0HPEHU6WDWHV¶WUDGLWLRQV.211 At a time when both legal achievements and political consensus 
are plummeting in Europe, this platform may provide an important µUHVWRUHSRLQW¶,QIDFWWKH
demoicratic argument emphasizes that many of the interests that the Member States, and their 
public opinions, have grown so defensive of, are ultimately shared. Shared is, for instance, the 
interest in devising a strategy to cope with an unprecedented refugee crisis that stays true to 
European values, while taking into account the reception capacities of the Member States. While 
European citizenship can offer no ready solutions, with its demoicratic character, it reminds that 
at the roots of the European project there was an endeavor to take into account and internalize 
into the actions of a nation state the perspective of the other. Whether the other, citizen from the 
Member State next door, or the other, migrant landing on European shores.  
It is from taking stock of this element of sharedness as well as commitment to no othering that 
European citizenship stands for, that renegotiation of a common European project, and of an 
acceptable social contract, may begin. Otherwise the Europeans who were meant to expand their 
cherished freedoms beyond national borders, are bound to fall back within the chains of their 
cozy but parochial national identities.212  
  
IV Conclusion 
Of the three disenchanted perspectives on European citizenship that were introduced at the 
beginning, this article¶VTXHVWUHVSRQGVPRUHGLUHFWO\WRthe third: the apparent dilution of the 
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OHJDF\RIULJKWVRI(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLSZKHQRQHZLWQHVVHVWKHH[SHULHQFHRI7&1VDW(XURSH¶V
frontiers. However WKHDUWLFOH¶V findings suggest higher level thoughts on the broader challenges 
confronting European citizenship, including the evolving resistance to free movement and the 
political relevance of the notion of supranational citizenship. Therefore, there is a narrower as 
well as a broader conclusion to it. 
In a narrower sense, and in relation to the original question set out in the introduction, European 
citizenship contributes to the status of TCNs the echoes of a demoicratic norm of belonging 
across borders. This norm dictates rights for at least a few TCNs and it lays a bridge across 
disconnected visions of inclusion in Europe that affect many. The bridge is fragile and swings 
vigorously in the stormy tones that characterise European immigration debates. However it 
marks a path and its conceptual premises also address two challenges emerging in the regulation 
and discourse of inclusion in Europe. With regards to the anomalous federalism of EU 
immigration discussed in Part II, a norm on belonging across the boundaries of several demoi 
offers a new justification for protection of individual rights in the context of shared immigration 
competences. Rights of migrants and citizens work not as outward limit to powers which are then 
used to share or shift burdens according to different rationales, but as the very reason for sharing 
responsibilities. With regards to the liberalism challenge presented in part III, the imperative of 
belonging across borders solicits softer application of integration requirements and management 
of discretion, so as to internalise the preferences of others. Value is returned this way to tolerance 
and equality.  
Beyond the condition of TCNs, a recognition-based norm of belonging confirms that the core 
status in Europe is national citizenship. While European citizenship, through the annexed free 
movement rights, stretches part of the content of national citizenship across national boundaries, 
those same national boundaries are not in question. The Member States ultimately retain 
competence to control them, but in respect of the rights of a discrete minority of migrant 
European nationals. A reflection in this sense could begin to tame the sense of threat that seems 
to sustain nationalist and Euro-sceptic political agendas.  The demoicratic argument may further 
appease this sense of threat by highlighting the role of European citizenship in blending ways of 
life that rest on similar conceptions of individual and collective good.  Immigration, which has 
dug such profound rifts in European discourses, may appear to be the least likely context to shed 
light on this side of European citizenship. Yet while European citizens bicker about their 
differences and close their doors to one another, immigration reminds that the door the migrants 
are knocking on, or bursting through, is ultimately a common one: it is the prospect of living the 
good, peaceful life that the European citizens live behind that door-without entirely 
understanding the shared vision underpinning it- that attracts migrants after all.   
Ultimately a demoiFUDWLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLS¶Vacquis suggests how a 
marriage with little love and even less understanding such as the one among the European 
peoples can survive bad weather as a union of mutual respect. It also lays bare the one bond that 
from several sides supports a supranational citizenship architecture: trust. This is the one 
citizenship cell from which all the others, rights, voice, solidarity, inclusion, have to descend.  
 
 
